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COMMEMORATIVE ESSAYS
the character or condition of the property to be carried or the circum-
stances, terms or conditions under which the carriage is to be performed,
are such as reasonably to jusify a special agreement," provided that no
bill of lading or other negotiable document was issued.
The conclusion must be that, far from conforming itself to existing
international legislation on the matter of carriage of goods, the Hague
Conference has, with the new paragraph to Article 23, adopted an unique
principle. Air law is hardly to be congratulated with this uniqueness. One
must wish that carriers will refrain from making use of the opportunity
offered to them by the new provision. But it would hardly be fair to
blame them, rather than those who created the opportunity. One cannot
help feeling that with this new paragraph a source of litigation has been
introduced into the Convention, of which lawyers and air law reviews
will be the main beneficiaries.
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF OUTER SPACE
By PROFESSOR DR. ALEX MEYERt
T HIS paper is written for an issue of the Journal of Air Law and Com-
merce containing articles on legal subjects in honour of the 75th birth-
day of Professor J. C. Cooper. On this occasion it seems appropriate to re-
member that everyone who is dealing with the legal problems of outer space
should be obliged to study the publications of Professor Cooper on this mat-
ter' a great number of which-because of their excellent quality-have been
translated into German in the "Zeitschrift fUr Luftrecht und Weltraum-
rechtsfragen" edited by our Institute. Naturally this does not mean that
there is agreement with all proposals of Professor Cooper. But his in-
genious and clear arguments in which he treated some of the most difficult
problems, always gave to all authors dealing with the same problems new
and important insights.
I. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
The legal problems connected with the exploration of outer space are
multiform though their relative importance and order of priority vary.
The question of the treatment of human beings eventually existing on
celestial bodies seems to present no need for practical solution at the
t Director of the Institute of Air Law and Space Law at the University of Cologne (Germany).
' I mention among others the following publications: High Altitude Flights and National Sov-
ereignty, IATA Bull. No. 13, p. 46 (June 1951), 1951 Int'l L. Q. 411, German translation in 1952
Zeitschrift fur Luftrecht 237 (hereafter ZLR); State Sovereignty in Space Development 1910-1914,
published on the occasion of Professor Dr. Alex Meyer's 75th birthday (December 15, 1954) in a
booklet presented by friends, colleagues and students entitled: Verkehrswissenschaftliche Veroffen-
tlichungen des Ministeriums fir Wirtschaft und Verkehr Nordhein-Westfalen, Beitrage zum in-
ternationalen Luftrecht; Air Law-A Field for International Thinking, 4 Transport and Com-
munications Rev. 1; Legal Problems of Outer Space, 1956 Proceedings of the Am. Soc'y
of Int'l L. 85, German translation in 1956 ZLR 171; Flight Space and the Satellites, 7 Int'l and
Comp. L. Q. 82 (1958), German translation in 1958 ZLR 175; Missiles and Satellites-the Law
and Our National Policy, 44 ABAJ 317 (1958), German translation in 1958 ZLR 394; Interna-
tional Control of Outer Space, 1960 Zeitschrift fiur Luftrecht and Weltraumrechtsfragen 288
(hereafter ZLW) (together with German translation); Additional Remarks, 1961 ZLW 103 (to-
gether with German translation); Self Defense in Outer Space and the United Nations, Air Force
Space Digest (Feb. 1962), German translation in 1962 ZLW 187.
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moment though some authors have already dealt with this question.!
Indeed we do not know anything about human beings living on other
celestial bodies. Nor do we suppose that human beings exist on the other
planets of our solar system. According to the opinion of experts, there
are in the galaxy millions of celestial bodies similar to the sun around
which planets may be in orbit. But the question cannot be answered
whether human beings exist on these planets. The enormous distance
between the earth and these celestial bodis make it impossible to find the
answer to that question. The problem of the allocation of frequencies for
communications with and among space vehicles is a question which has
been designated as urgent. But this is a special matter the treatment of
which should be left to experts in the field. The same should be true for
the question of the safeguards to be taken against contamination of
outer space or from outer space by microbes. A special "Committee on
Contamination by Extraterrestrial Explorations" is dealing with this
matter under the auspices of the "International Council of Scientific
Unions." Legal problems also arise from the intended establishment of
space platforms, conceived in 1952 by Wernher von Braun in his Mars
Projects. They are stations of support to be established at a certain height in
space, in order to supply and repair space craft which will fly directly from
the space platform to a planet. These legal problems do not seem to be of
particular actual importance as at the moment such space platforms do
not exist. Certainly the establishment of such space platforms of support
in outer space is to be considered lawful because outer space, as will be
explained below, is a free area. On the other hand, space platforms them-
selves would be subject to the control of the State which established them.
This State would therefore not be obliged to open these stations to public
traffic so that everyone might land there. But if the State exercising control
over such a station were to open it for general traffic, it would not have
the right arbitrarily to refuse a landing.
II. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS
Legal problems of more importance and more practical reality are the
following:
1. The legal status of outer space.
2. The use of outer space and of the celestial bodies therein.
3. The border line to be fixed between air space and outer space.
4. The legal treatment of spacecraft or parts thereof falling to earth in
foreign States.
5. Liability for damages caused by spacecraft.
A. The Legal Status Of Outer Space
No controversy of importance concerning the legal status of outer space
seems to exist any more. The nearly unanimous view is that outer space
is to be considered a "free area" as the High Seas. The decisive reason
for this point is the following: It might be impossible-even by drawing
fictitious vertical borders-to establish in outer space a determined area
above the borders of a State which would correspond to the respective
2 See Haley, Space Law and Metalaw-a Synoptic View, Harv. L. Record, Nov. 1, 1956;
German translation 1957 ZLR 59.
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boundaries of a State on earth. The enormous distances between the sur-
face of the earth and outer space make it impossible to determine whether
events in outer space happened in an area corresponding to a certain State
on earth, even without taking into account the rotation of the earth. The
extension of sovereignty of a State into outer space does not seem feasible.
B. The Use Of Outer Space And Of The Celestial Bodies Therein
1. Of course the fact that States cannot exercise sovereign rights in
outer space does not preclude other activities of the States in this free
area, particularly the exploration of outer space. Activities of the States
are also normal on the High Seas. Neither does the fact that outer space
is to be considered a free area mean that it should be in a condition of
lawlessness and anarchy. Just as legal rules exist for navigation on the
High Seas, laws must be made for outer space to be governed by laws which
provide a legal order therein. But the legal rules to be formed for outer
space cannot be based on the sovereign rights of a State in outer space. They
can only be established by an international agreement concluded on earth.
In my opinion the law of outer space will therefore not be an extrater-
restrial law, as has been asserted, but a terrestrial law determined for the
human beings on the earth undertaking flights into outer space. Naturally
this law must consider the particular conditions of outer space. As regards
the nature of the activities of the States in outer space, the United Nations
as well as nearly all States, particularly the United States of America and
the Soviet Union, have repeatedly declared that the use of outer space
should be only a "peaceful" one. On the other hand, the question as to
what is meant by the term "peaceful" has never been decided, neither by
the United Nations nor by any State. Therefore, the question of how to
interpret the term "peaceful" arises. Is it to mean "non-military" or
"non-aggressive"? In my opinion the term "peaceful" must be under-
stood in the sense of "non-aggressive." To interpret the term "peaceful"
in the sense of "non-military" would lead to the consequence that no
military action could be "peaceful." But such interpretation would be
in contradiction to all practice. Ordinary armed manoeuvres in time of
peace which do not affect another State in a hostile manner are to be
considered as peaceful in spite of the fact that all military manoeuvres
finally serve for the preparation of war. Even the atomic tests under-
taken by the United States of America and the Soviet Union in time of
peace are to be considered as not constituting objectionable "aggressive"
conduct. Therefore, in my opinion, neither can the ordinary use of recon-
naissance satellites launched in peace time be signified as non-peaceful in
every case. Such satellites have a military connotation but at the moment
of their launching in peacetime they have generally no aggressive con-
duct. As far as I know, balloons or aircraft ascendets in the air have
never been considered in peacetime as "non-peaceful" objects, though
they, too, have the capacity of observing the surface of the earth. The
possibility of viewing the surface of the earth and of examining the
events happening there with appropriate instruments is an unchangeable
fact connected with all kinds of instruments launched into the space
a The problem was discussed in detail in the paper given by N. Kittrie before the Fourth Collo-
quium on the Law of Outer Space at the XIIth International Astronautical Congress, Washington,
October, 1961.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
above the earth. It seems impossible to consider the use of all these
instruments as "non-peaceful" in every case. On the other hand, excep-
tional cases may exist in which the use of these instruments has to be
considered as "non-peaceful." If one agrees that the ordinary use of
instruments launched into space above the earth (reconnaissance satellites
included) cannot be considered as "non-peaceful," only because they have
the capacity for observing the surface of the earth, no action under-
taken under the concept of self-defense would be possible in these cases,
independently of the question as to how Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter is to be interpreted.
2. With respect to the use of the celestial bodies, the principal question
is whether a celestial body can be occupied by a State. The question has
to be answered in the negative. First of all, the merely symbolic hoisting
of the ensign of a State on a celestial body can never be considered
sufficient for establishing an occupation. The establishment of sovereignty
rights on a stateless place ,needs an effective occupation. This means that
the stateless place must be taken into possession with the intention of
exercising actual and permanent control, and this would only be the
case if the occupying State established such installations in the territory
concerned as are necessary to assure the exercise of an exclusive sover-
eignty. For this reason, the planting of the national emblems of the Union
of the Soviet Socialist Republics on the moon by a Soviet cosmic rocket
on September 14, 1959, was not sufficient to establish territorial rights
of this State on the moon. This was also the view of the Soviet Union.
It declared immediately after the rocket had reached the moon that it
would not make any territorial claims to the moon as a result of the
landing of its rocket there. However, the first condition of the occupa-
tion of a territory is that such territory be capable of being occupied at
all. It is extremely doubtful whether celestial bodies fulfill this condition.
In my view, it has rightly been stated that no State can raise any terri-
torial claims to any other celestial body, since outer space and the celestial
bodies therein represent a res omnium communis, serving all the members
of the human society, and not a res nullius.
C. The Border Line To Be Fixed Between Air Space And Outer Space
As regards the boundary to be fixed between air space and outer
space, it cannot be doubtful that such a border line must be fixed at a
future time. But the establishment of this border line will become really
important only when space traffic substantially increases. The border line
will be necessary to make possible a clear decision as to whether a certain
act on board a spacecraft occurred while still within the sovereign area
of a State or within the free area of outer space. At present, however, a
real traffic into outer space does not exist. Even today one can agree with
the view expressed in the 1959 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the
United Nations' that "the determination of precise limits for air space
and outer space does not present a legal problem calling for priority con-
sideration at this moment." In considering the height to which the border
line between air space and outer space is to be drawn in the future, one
must take into consideration, on the one hand, that it will not be possible
to draw geographically or topographically an exact border line due to
4 United Nations General Assembly, July 14, 1959, A 4141, p. 68.
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the irregular shape, both of the earth and of the atmosphere. On the
other hand, in a technical and medical respect typical conditions of
outer space may exist at altitudes belonging to the air space. Therefore,
the border line can at some future time only be fixed numerically by
an international agreement of the States, even if the limit provided for
between air space and outer space should not exactly correspond to the
geographical or topographical facts. As a final decision on this matter
will be influenced by political, economic, scientific and military factors,
experts on these matters should be heard before any final decision.
D. The Legal Treatment Of Spacecraft Or Parts Thereof
Falling To Earth in Foreign States
On the occasion of the hearings in the United States of America before
the "Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration,"' the legal
adviser of the State Department, Mr. Loftus Becker, stated the following:
As respects the ownership of a space vehicle returning to earth, some com-
mentators have suggested that at least as respects unmanned space vehicles,
the appropriate analogy is a bullet-ownership of which is abandoned by the
act of firing. An alternative rationale would be that any such vehicle enter-
ing the airspace of a sovereign State without the latter's permission should be
placed in the category of smuggled goods.
These views seem to me to be erroneous. Certainly the ownership of a
bullet is given up at the moment of firing, because it will itself be de-
stroyed in the moment of destroying things. Contrary to this, a space-
craft with valuable instruments or even with animals is launched with
the hope that it will return to earth, and the State or other entity which
launched it never has the idea of giving up the ownership of the space-
craft and the things therein. On the contrary, the State is greatly inter-
ested in recovering them. Neither can one say that unmanned spacecraft
or parts of these falling in the territory of a foreign State could be placed
in the category of smuggled goods. Smuggled goods are those which
somebody tries to send into a foreign country with the intention of not
paying the required duties. Spacecraft are not launched for this purpose.
According to maritime law, stranded goods are always given back to
the owner, provided the owner is found. Only in cases where he cannot
be found can the country on whose beaches such goods have been thrown
claim possession. Therefore, the owner of spacecraft remains its owner after
its launching and has, according to international private law, the right
to claim the restitution of the spacecraft or parts thereof from anyone
who has taken them in possession. The realisation of this right would be
impossible only if provisions of public law would hinder it, for these
provisions would prevail. Certainly there exists the generally recognised
provision of Article 1 of the Chicago Convention that the States have
the complete and exclusive sovereignty over air space above their ter-
ritory so that flights into the air space above these territories are only
possible with their consent. But as far as I know, no rule of international
law exists which entitles a State generally to confiscate objects falling
on its territory accidentally from the space above it. A possible exception
could exist when an offence would be suspected, e.g., in the case of spying.
'Eighty-fifth Congress, 2d Sess. H.R. 11881, p. 1275.
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The landing State must, therefore, be obliged to return unmanned space
vehicles and their contents, landed accidentally on its territory, to the
launching State.
E. Liability For Damage Caused By Spacecraft
The Legal Committee of the German Scientific Society for Air Naviga-
tion of which I have the honour to be the chairman, dealt with the ques-
tion of liability for damages caused by spacecraft at its meeting of June
15, 1962, in Munich.
The Legal Committee recommended the application of the following
principles:
1. The liability for damages caused by spacecraft should be regulated
as a part of a general convention concerning the conditions under which
outer space flight shall be licensed.
2. The Convention should apply not only to damages caused by
spacecraft in flight to the surface of the earth, but should also cover
damages caused by spacecraft in air space to aircraft and persons or goods
therein and in outer space to other spacecraft. The application of the
rules of the Convention to damages caused by spacecraft in air space
seems appropriate as the damages to which aircraft are exposed by
spacecraft are not inferior to the damages to which persons and goods
are exposed on earth.
3. The Convention should apply to private aircraft as well as to
State aircraft.
4. The Convention should apply to damages caused in the territory
of a Contracting State (earth, water, air space) or in a free area (High
Seas, stateless territory, outer space) by a spacecraft licensed in the
territory of a Contracting State. It does not seem necessary that the
person who suffers damage should have the nationality of a Contracting
State.
5. As to the type of conduct giving rise to liability for damages
caused by spacecraft in flight to the surface of the earth or in air space,
the principles of the Rome Convention of 1952 should be applied. There-
fore, no proof of fault should be required. Compensation should be paid
upon proof only that the damage was caused by a spacecraft in flight
or persons or things falling therefrom, or by collisions between aircraft
and spacecraft. In case of collisions between two or more spacecraft, the
proof of fault should be required for compensation as anyone operating
a spacecraft has to realise that in case of collision with another space-
craft he himself has to suffer the damage if he cannot prove fault on the
part of the other operator or of the servants and agents of the latter.
6. Contributory negligence of the person who suffers damages or of
his servants or agents reduces the compensation or excludes it entirely.
7. As regards the person liable for damages, the operator of the space-
craft causing damage (in case of collisions, the operators of each space-
craft) shall be liable. The liability should be limited to a certain amount.
The operator should be obliged to be insured in a satisfactory manner up
to a certain limit to be fixed by the Convention. Similar to Article 15,
alinea 4, of the Rome Convention of 1952 any of the following securities
shall be deemed satisfactory instead of insurance:
a. A cash deposit in a depository maintained by the Contracting
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State where the spacecraft has been licensed or with a bank authorised
to act as a depository by that State;
b. a guarantee given by a bank authorised to do so by the Con-
tracting State where the spacecraft has been licensed, and financial re-
sponsibility of which has been verified by that State;
c. a guarantee given by the Contracting State where the spacecraft
has been licensed, if that State undertakes that it will not claim immunity
from suit in respect of that guarantee.
According to the example given in the German Atomic Law (Article
38) and in the Euratom draft of an additional Convention to the Con-
vention of Paris on third party liability in the field of nuclear energy
(July 29, 1960), framed by the organization for European Economic
Corporation, in case that the damage is higher than the foreseen guarantee,
the State which has licensed the spacecraft shall be subsidiarily liable for
the compensation of the higher damage.
8. Actions against the operator of private spacecraft, so far as the
claim does not exceed the limits of the insurance or the guarantee, should
be brought before the competent Court of the place where the damage
occurred. Actions for damages caused in stateless territories are to be
brought before the Court of the State of which the claimant is a na-
tional. The International Court of Justice should decide on appeal. Actions
against the operator of a State spacecraft and of private spacecraft, as
far as the claim exceeds the limits of the insurance or guarantee, should
be brought exclusively before the International Court of Justice.
Comparing the principles laid down by the Legal Committee of the
German Scientific Society for Air Navigation with the Memorandum
delivered by Professor Cooper to the Third Colloquium on the Law of
Outer Space in Stockholm in 1960, one can state that these principles
are to a high degree in accordance with the proposals of that Memorandum.
Differences exist only with respect to the following points:
1. Professor Cooper answers in the affirmative the question whether
compensation for damages caused by spacecraft to third persons on the
earth should be excluded, as provided by the Rome Convention for damage
caused by aircraft, if the damage results from the mere passage of the
spacecraft through outer space in conformity with provided traffic regu-
lations. In other words damages caused by noise could be excluded from
compensation. The views of the members of the Legal Committee of the
German Scientific Society for Air Navigation were divided on this ques-
tion. So the Committee resolved to leave this question open to further
discussion. In my opinion the provision of the Rome Convention should
not be taken over by a Convention concerning spacecraft. It would be
very difficult to state whether a spacecraft was flying in conformity with
the regulation provided for outer space.
Professor Cooper in his Memorandum at Stockholm proposed that the
domestic State of the person damaged should at first grant compensation
within the scope of the liability limits of the Convention and subsequent-
ly exercise a right of recourse. The German Legal Committee was op-
posed to such a regulation as it would be necessary for the domestic State
of the person damaged to have itself sued and to have certified the justifi-
cation of the claims by legal procedures, otherwise such a State would
